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SPRING 1967]
THE ANOMALOUS POSITION OF THE INSURANCE
AGENT-AN INVITATION TO SCHIZOPHRENIA
ROBERT M. MORRISONi-
T HE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS built into the American
Agency System' is beginning to tear that structure apart. After
more than a century of successful refutation of St. Matthew's maxim
'that "no man can -serve two masters,"'2 the dual role of the insurance
agent3 as simultaneous representative of the insurer and the insured4
is creating an intolerable situation. The unique accommodation to
economic factors that has permited the image of "Independent Agent"
to develop' (incongruous as 'that title is in legal concept) is unable to
cope with the changes that are developing in the insurance industry
t Member of the Massachusetts Bar. A.B., Harvard University, 1924, LL.B.,
1927. [Mr. Morrison is general counsel for various insurance companies. - ed.]
1. For a description of the American Agency System, which is the arrangement
under which the typical insurance agent operates, see Hedlund v. Farmers Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp. 535 (D. Minn. 1956) ; Ballagh v. Polk-Warren Mut. Ins. Ass'n,
136 N.W.2d 496 (Iowa 1965); Woodruff v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 300 Mich. 54,
1 N.W.2d 450 (1942).
2. Matthew 6:24.
3. An "insurance agent" is a person expressly or impliedly authorized to represent
an insurer in dealing with third persons in matters relating to insurance. The term
"agent" as used in this article will refer to: a person engaged in writing property
and liability insurance as distinguished from life insurance and allied lines; a person
representing more than one insurer with freedom to select the insurer with which he
will place the business; a person who represents so-called agency companies and not
a direct writer; a person who is paid a commission by the company out of the premium
it receives instead of a fixed salary; and a person who operates his own office rather
than one who is housed by an insurer. This is the type of person to whom the term
"independent agent" is applied in the industry. The National Association of Insurance
Agents has widely promoted the symbol of the "Big I" to designate such an agent.
See Travelers Indem. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 292 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1961)
29 AM. JUR. Insurance § 135 (1960) ; 44 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 136, 137 (1945).
4. See Ivey v. United Nat'l Indem. Co., 259 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1958); Iowa
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Richards, 229 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Indemnity Ins. Co. of
No. Am. v. Midwest Transfer Co., 184 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1950) ; France v. Citizens
Cas. Co., 400 Ill. 55, 79 N.E.2d 28 (1948).
5. Fire insurance agents occupy a very curious and anomalous position. Legally,
and in fact, they are agents for the companies and must protect the companies'
interests, but at the same time their personal relationship with the insured makes
them equally solicitous for his best interests. Add to this the fact that the agent
represents not one but several companies and that he is called upon to distribute
his favors among them all, and we have a notable example of a man who is
serving many masters. That the system works as well as it does is remarkable and
particularly when the equally anomalous condition is noticed that, in general, agents
are paid a commission upon the premium receipts, so that a large volume of busi-
ness and particularly hazardous high-rated business is for the benefit of the agent,
irrespective of whether the results are favorable or unfavorable to the company.
I REPORT Or THIE JOINT CoMm. Or THiE STATE or N.Y. (Hughes Report 92 (1910))[hereinafter cited as HUGHEs REPORT].
(535)
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since United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.0 The agent
is under pressure from .the insurers 'he represents to adjust his business
methods and attitudes so as to help them in their competitive battle
with other insurers and is under simultaneous pressure from his in-
sureds to employ a 'high standard of professional skill in securing for
them a maximum of insurance protection at a minimum cost. The
agent is thus caught in a dilemma. He must split his personality if he
is to serve conflicting interests; it is an invitation to schizophrenia.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The 'historical development that 'led to the creation of this hybrid
representative will be discussed only 'briefly. From a beginning -in which
the agent was paid fifty cents per policy 'by the 'insured for writing
the contract and, later, another fifty cents from the same 'source for
making a survey of the property to be insured, the agent grew i'n
power until he was able in 'many cases to fix his own commission.
Competition for business 'between insurers led them to offer an ever-
increasing portion of the premium dollar to -the agent who could
produce the business. The "market"' sought the producer.
At the end of 'the Civil War, the :insurance agent, by customs
and contract, had assumed a role quite different from that of the
soliciting agent in general business. For example, the agent and not
the insurer was entitled to the "expirations list," which 'is the list of
customers he had procured for 'hi's principal and which, in large measure,
constitutes goodwill.9 Thus, up to the moment w'hen the insurance
agent had determined with what insurer to place the business, he was
deemed to .be acting as agent for the insured to procure insurance."°
The same economic forces which 'led to the competitive advantage of
the agent vis-a-vis the ,insurer led to the development of ;the role of
insurance broker.i The 'insurers were willing to pay for business
produced by one who did not represent them under contract. Once
6. 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held that fire insurance companies were engaged
in commerce among the several states and that the Sherman Act did apply to them,
thus overruling Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). The South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n case and other decisions stripped away the protection against
federal antitrust laws which the insurance industry had enjoyed for a hundred years,
and it led to the passage in 1945 of the McCarran Act, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1964). See VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE 126 (3d ed. 1966).
7. The term "market" is used in the insurance industry to designate an insurer
who is willing to assume a particular risk and issue a policy on it.
8. Custom plays an important role in the operation of the agent in the insurance
industry. See Long v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 Pa. 335, 20 Atl.
1014 (1891).
9. Woodruff v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., supra note 1; Kerr & Elliott v. Green
Mountain Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 A.2d 164 (Vt. 1941).
10. COUCH, INSURANCE §§ 14:19, 14:22 (2d ed -.....) [hereinafter cited as COUCH].
11. "An insurance broker is 'One who acts as a middleman between the assured
and insurer, and who solicits insurance from the public under no employment from any
special company, and who either places an order for insurance with a company selected
[VOL. 12 : p. 535
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again, this payment came out of the premium dollars collected by the
insurer for its policy, although the broker's services were actually
being rendered to the -insured.
The sharp distinction 'between the role of broker and agent was
gradually eroded. By statute, many states declared that the broker shall
be deemed to be the agent of the insurer for specific purposes; usually,
payment of the premium to the broker constitutes payment to the
insurer.12 Courts, in their desire to protect insureds, sometimes found
that the broker had, in fact, acted as agent for the insurer." The
high water mark ,in this particular direction was probably reached in
an Illinois decision, which held that the broker had acted as agent
for Lloyds of London, an institution which for some two hundred
years has operated outside of the insuran'ce agency 'system. 4  This
blurring of distinction between 'agent and broker can be found in the
many court decisions where the terms are used interchangeably without
any attempt to determine whether there was any limitation on the
agent's obligations either to insurer or insured. 5  Conversely, from
time to time, 'an insurance agent would be unable to find a market for
the insured's requirements among the insurers that he represented, and
was obliged to "broker" the business through the agent of isome other
insurer. To do so, he would have to 'hold a broker's license."8 The ulti-
mate result was that, while not every broker has been appointed an
agent by some insurer, most agents 'hold broker's licenses were they
are available.
The resultant situation has created many a judicial -headache.'
To those engaged in the insurance business, however, -it has long offered
by the assured or, in the absence of any selection by him, then with a company selected
by such broker .... .' Zak v. Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co., 58 Ill. App. 2d 341, __--, 208
N.E.2d 29, 34 (1965). See 16 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8726,
at 152-53 (1941) [hereinafter cited as APPLIMAN] ; 29 AM. JUR. Insurance § 135
(1960). As a practical matter, in some areas (the large metropolitan areas) most
business is handled by brokers, while in others, brokers are of minor importance or
non-existent. See I HUGMEs RE PORT 98.
12. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 169 (1959), "An insurance agent or broker
acting for a person other than himself in negotiating, continuing or renewing any
policy of insurance or any annuity or pure endowment contract, shall, for the purpose
of receiving any premium therefor, be held to be the agent of the company. . . ." See
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Cannon, 349 F.2d 941 (1965) ; Gechijian v. Richmond
Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 487, 11 N.E.2d 478 (1937). Similar provisions can be found in
Minnesota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
13. Dudley v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 330 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1963). See Travelers
Indem. Co. v. National Indem. Co., supra note 3; Ivey v. United Nat'l Indem. Co.,
supra note 4.
14. Mooney v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 33 I1. 2d 566, 213 N.E.2d 283(1965), reversing 54 Ill. App. 2d 237, 204 N.E.2d 51 (1964).
15. See Lawrence v. Francis, 223 Ark. 584, 267 S.W.2d 306 (1954).
16. See Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1951).
17. "The relationship of agent and insurance company cannot depend solely upon
general agency principles because these relationships have their own peculiar rights and
obligations." Bushnell v. Kraft, 133 Ind. App. 474, 183 N.E.2d 340 (1962). See
General Ace., Fire & Life Ins. Co. v. Browne, 217 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1954).
SPRING 1967]
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a modus vivendi, using a blend of business custom, unexpressed under-
standing, balancing of interests and adjusitment to the economic forces
involved. Insurers accepted the fact that their agents' prime interest
lay with the insured, the source of the premium out of which his
commission was taken. An equilibrium was established that with some
accommodation withstood ithe stresses of a century of growth.
The contract which established the principal-agent relationship
between insurer and insurance agent was reduced to a simple form.'"
It fixed the agent's authority by territory and type of risk; it gave
the agent authority to bind the insurer; it called for a report of business
written 'and the payment ,of 'accounts on penalty of -forfeiting the owner-
s'hip of expirations; and it eliminated any responsibility of the ,insurer
for the agent's expenses of operation. A survey of the decided cases
in this area of operations indicates that most of them were suits for
an accounting for premiums owed,"9 where the agent 'acted in an un-
authorized manner, 20 or where the agent failed to heed the insurer's
request to terminate the insurer's liability under a particular policy.2 '
In the realm of broker-insured litigation, the majority of cases involved
the negligent failure of the broker to procure insurance coverage which
he 'had agreed to procure,22 or 'his failure to advise the insured of h'is
inability to do so. 2
3
II. CHANGE IN CONDITIONS
The equilibrium so carefully worked out through the years is
now, unfortunately, 'being destroyed. The business structure which
permitted the insurance agent to 'balance his dtities to the insurer and
to the insured and thereby to walk a tightrope of responsibility be-
tween the two is beginning to disintegrate.
It is being undermined by the insurers who now find themselves
holding the upper 'hand in their power struggle with the agent. The
18. Certain provisions, such as that controlling the ownership of expirations, were
apparently left intentionally vague.
19. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Weatherwax & Gentry, 247 Ala. 143, 22 So.
2d 733 (1945). See Thatcher v. H. C. Baldwin Agency, Inc., 283 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1960) ; Robertson v. Malone, 190 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1951).
20. Manufacturers Cas. Indem. Co. v. Martin Lebreton Ins. Agency, 242 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1957) ; Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Frisbee, 316 Mich. 540, 25 N.E.2d 521 (1947)
United States Cas. Co. v. Hiers, 233 S.C. 333, 104 S.E.2d 561 (1958).
21. Mitton v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 988 (1952) ; Insurance, Inc.
v. Furneaux, 62 N.M. 249, 308 P.2d 577 (1957) ; Douglas v. Koontz, 137 W.Va. 345,
71 S.E.2d 319 (1952).
22. Johnson v. Illini Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 211, 151 N.E.2d 634 (1958);
Cass v. Lord, 236 Mass. 430, 128 N.E. 716 (1920) ; Aresto v. National Ben Franklin
Ins. Co., 184 Pa. Super. 114, 133 A.2d 304 (1957)
23. Rider v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 201 A.2d 561 (1964); Marano v. Sabbio, 26
N.J. Super. 201, 97 A.2d 732 (1953). Cf. DeWees v. Cedarbaum, 381 P.2d 830 (Okla.
1963); COUCH § 25:34.
[VOL. 12 : p. 535
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reasons for this shift in power are beyond the scope of this article. 4
The result, however, is a sharp tightening of. the reins. Insurance
agents find insurers demanding the first call upon their loyalities. Both
in the area of underwriting and of loss adjustment, the agent is face
to face with the need to promote the interests of the insurer if he is to
maintain his markets.2" As a result he cannot place less desirable risks
in his prime markets, lest an adverse loss ratio lose him those markets.
This may oblige him to place the business in a market less advantageous
from the -insured',s point of view. Similarly, the agent may 'hesitate to
suggest certain types of insurance which would 'be 'beneficial for the
insured, 'because his markets have advised him to avoid such coverages.
In the event of a loss, the agent, who formerly encouraged and
aided an :insured in maximizing his claim within the policy coverage,
feels himself constrained to soft-pedal his advice for fear of antagonizing
the insurer, whose goodwill is necessary ,for him 'to con'tinue as an
insurance agent.2 6 The insurance agent might have been able to adjust
to the pressures from the !insurer and maintain his Janus-like role of
serving dual interests were it not for the fact that the insured has begun
to assert pressure on his own behalf, demanding a higher standard of
performance from the agent.
III. AGENT'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
Of the established duties that every agent owes to his principal,
-two are of particular relevance in the relationship 'between an insur-
ance agent or 'broker and the insured - the duty to be loyal and the
duty to 'use due care and avoid negligence.2 7 :As interpreted by the
courts, 'a 'basic ingredient of the duty of loyalty is the absence of any
conflict of interest. 28 An agent may not make 'a profit at the pri'ndpal's
24. These arise primarily from the fact that markets rather than volume have
become of primary importance. They include the reduction in number of insurers due
to mergers, continued adverse loss ratios in certain types of insurance, shrinking of
reinsurance facilities, the bad loss experience with certain types of structures and
operations, the temporary diminution of insurance company surpluses due to stock
market conditions and the lack of additional capital investment in the insurance
industry to cover the increasing insurable values in our. expanding economy. Utilizing
their power, insurers have cut commission rates, dropped unprofitable agents, reversed
their program of protecting an agent who has made a mistake and now resist marginal
claims which earlier they might have paid to maintain the. agent's favor.
25. He would then have to "broker" it through other agents with whom he would
have to split his commission. See Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Keystate Ins. Agency, 420
Pa. 578, 218 A.2d 294 (1966).
26. Agents are known to pay small claims under "Homeowners" policies out of
their own pocket rather than run the risk of irritating the insurer.
27. Lowitt v. Pearsall Chem. Corp., 242 Md. 245, 219 A.2d 67 (1966) ; CoucH
§ 25:37; APPLEMAN § 8833; M¢I-h m, Agency.§ 2370 (2d ed. 1914); 29 Am. JuR.
Insurance § 163 (1960).
28. See Rozen v. Cohen- ..... Mass .....-, 214 N.E.2d 451 (1966).
SPRING 1967]
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expense,29 sell his own goods to his principal without disclosure,80 or
act for both parties without disclosure."' Even though the agent is
acting primarily for the insurer, he occupies a position of trust toward
the insured, who is considered as being his client.3 2
When most insurers offered the 'same contract and schedules of
rates and commissions were similar, the -apparent built-in conflict of
in'terest 'led to little real conflict. But today, insurers vie with each other
both in the extent of protection -they offer under their contracts and the
rates they charge. Usually the more liberal the policy toward the
insured, the less commission is paid to the agent or broker. The
apparent conflict is now becoming real. The insured's representative
must put his principal's welfare above his own or 'breach his obligation
of loyalty. As stated 'by one Court, "the legal consequences of the
acts of an insurance agen't who, in 'attemitting 'to preserve the confidence
reposed in 'him by company or client, must by necessity render 'a dis-
service to one or the other, are ofttimes severe." 3
It is the duty of the agent to use good faith in procuring insur-
ance on the best possible terms, including the securing of policies
which contain cost-reducing provisions where this would work to the
insured's benefit.34 The violation of the duty to be loyal is closely
29. See Fisk v. Kildare Truck Line, Inc., 112 So. 2d 310 (La. 1959) ; In re
Brownings Estate, 175 Misc. 107, 22 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Surr. Ct. 1940), aff'd sub nom.
In re Browning's Will, 260 App. Div. 1013, 24 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1940).
30. See Budnick v. The Maccabees, 230 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962);
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Gordon's Trans., Inc., 154 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1946).
31. "The possibility of dual agency, and its propriety where there is good faith,
no conflict of interest, and due authority from both principals, is well recognized....
It is not seen, however, how such a relationship, even if it existed, would relieve [the
agent] . . .of the duty of due care, to either, or both, of the principals." Hampton
Roads Carriers v. Boston Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 338, 343 n.9 (D. Md. 1957). (Foot-
notes of the court omitted.) See also 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 141 (1945).
32. Insurance representatives have a trust relation imposed upon them by the very
nature of the service which they render. It is necessary that they cultivate the
friendship and trust of their clients, and this requires that they divulge every aspect
of their mutual contracts frankly and noticeably. Their clients expect and believe
that they will be informative on such matters which are less understood by them.
Hannon Motor Lines, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 214 F. Supp. 250, 256 (N.D.
Ind. 1963).
"Under the course of conduct pursued by the agency in this case, and, indeed,
under the well known and accepted relationship of trust generally existing between a
client and his insurance agent, the client, of necessity, must and, therefore, has a right
to rely upon his agent, at least to a limited degree .. " Smith v. Travellers Fire
Ins. Co., 90 So. 2d 586, 589 (La. Ct. App. 1956). See also Lynd v. Heffernan, 286
App. Div. 597, 146 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1955).
33. Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Bair, 246 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1957).
34. An insurance broker, particularly one who acts as general agent for insured
and who undertakes to keep the property insured from year to year, is under a
duty to exercise good faith and reasonable diligence to procure the insurance on
the best terms he can obtain; and in this connection proper diligence requires him
to canvass the market and have adequate knowledge as to the different companies
and terms available.
Zeff Distrib. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 389 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965),
quoting 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 172 (1945). See also Hampton Roads Carriers v.
Boston Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 338 (D. Md. 1957); Johnson & Higgins v. Harper
Transp. Co., 228 Fed. 730 (D. Mass. 1915) ; Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal.
[VOLe. 12: p. 535
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related to the duty not to be negligent. Failure to procure insurance
at Ihe lowest cost may result from the agent's personal interest in
placing the business with a stock company which he represents rather
than with a mutual company which returns a dividend to the insured.
The agent may find it to his personal advantage to place the business
with the insurer that pays 'him the highest percentage of commission.
Such violation of duty may also result from the agent's desire to maxi-
mize commission by writing the insurance with an insurer which he
represents as agenft, rather than ,brokering it. Or, as the cases indicate,
the agent's failure may have resulted from an oversight or a lack of
knowledge on his part. 5 In the past the results of such failure may
have 'been -mitigated 'by concessions of the insurer or 'have 'been over-
looked by the insured. The climate of opinion under which such
leniency flourished 'is rapidly disappearing. Parallel with the growth of
malpractice suits 'against doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects and
other professional men,88 there is developing a tendency to sue insur-
ance agents and brokers both for 'breach of contract and in tort for
negligence.37  The same standard of measurement is applied: "The
agent or 'broker must have the skill ordinarily possessed by the pro-
fessional he holds 'himself out as."88 This is usually a question for the
jury to decide.8 9
IV. THE FUTURE
The pressure which 'is breaking the American Agency System
apart can 'be traced directly to the trend of legal decisions. Our courts
have refused to accept any longer the concept of the agent-broker which
is basic to that system - the concept which allowed a man to serve
App. 16, 22 P.2d 35 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933) ; Roberts v. Sunnen, 38 Wash. 2d 370, 229
P.2d 542 (1951).
35. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, 55 Ill. App. 2d 373,
204 N.E.2d 481 (1965) (memorandum opinion).
36. Smythe v. Missouri R.R., 72 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Mauldin v. Sheffer, 133
Ga. 883, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966); Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434,
111 S.E.2d 773 (1959). See Patrick v. Sedwick, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964), as an
extreme example.
37. This is no doubt fostered by the knowledge that most insurance agents now
carry malpractice insurance known as "Errors and Omissions" insurance. Hardt v.
Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961). For an interesting life insurance case,
see Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Hawaii 1958). See also Hamacher v.
Tumy, 222 Ore. 341, 352 P.2d 493 (1960) ; Portella v. Sonnenberg, 74 N.J. Super. 354,
181 A.2d 385 (1962).
38. Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., 132 Cal. App. 16, 22 P.2d 35 (Dist. Ct. App.
1933). See Lowitt v. Pearsall Chem. Corp., 242 Md. 245, 219 A.2d 67 (1966) ; Ryder
v. Lynch, 42 N.J. 465, 201 A.2d 561 (1964).
39. Dudley v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1962); Smythe v.
Missouri R.R., 72 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Derby v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 272, 230
S.W.2d 481 (1950). See Colpe Inv. Co. v. Seeley & Co., supra note 38; Mooney v.
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two masters and at the same time retain sufficient independence to
allow 'him to serve ihis own interests as well. Disregarding the delicate
balancing of the interests which alone enabled the system to function
effectively, the courts 'have progressively insisted on forcing the 'busi-
ness of property and liability 'insurance into the same mold of legal
rules 'and principles which apply to other business activities.
It is possible that this trend will stop short of requiring com-
plete uniformity, that the business of distribubing such insurance will
be accepted as being sui generis, one in which a certain degree of
deviation is permissible. This could permit a new balance of the in-
terests to be worked out. Conceivably, the insurer-agent relationship
would be divided into two ,roles: a producer, acting independent of any
duty to the insurer and paid a commission for dired ing a piece of
business to the insurer, and a serviceman, who would be hired by the
insurer to perform various service functions for which he would be
paid by the insurer and to whom he would owe undivided loyalty.
As a practical matter, the agent's commission would be divided into
two parts; a basic commission, as producer act-ing solely on behalf of
the insured, and additional units of compensation, also by way of
commission, for those 'service procedures he is called upon to perform
for the insurer. Not all agents would perform the same spectrum of
functions. This is not completely alien to present operations in part
of the property -and liability insurance business, where central policy
writing and central premium billing have been introduced with a
reduction in commissions paid. Such a financial rearrangement may
destroy the viability of small or marginal agencies but it would meet
the legal requirements.
Some indication that the ultimate readjustment in the system need
be only so limited in nature could be read into the decision in Smith
v. Travellers Fire Ins. Co. ° where the court states that the client has
a right to rely upon his agent "to aa -limited degree." It would appear
that little confidence should be placed in any such possibility. The deci-
sions indicate a willingness to stretch the agent's duty to the insured
to a point 'where he is, in fact, protected. In the Smith case, the court
did find a breach of even t.he limited duty.
Another balancing point might be found in the adoption of a
relationship similar -to that existing between the parties in the life
insurance 'business. Traditionally, the life agent acts only as a solicitor.
He can -make no commitment for the insurer; he can only submit an
application. As a result, there ,is little basis for creating a professional-
client relationship between the agent 'and the insured. That such rela-
40. 90 So. 2d 586, 589 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
[VOL. 12: p. 535
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tionship does exist, however, is shown by the Knox v. Anderson deci-
sion.' If the courts should decide to expand the theory of duty ex-
pressed in that decision, an increasing degree of responsibility on the
part of the 'life insurance agent to the insured could develop.
A drastic change would 'be necessary to accommodate such an
adjustment. Life insurance agents do not usually own their expira-
tions, and they can even forfeit their right to limited renewal com-
missions under various conditions. This is also the case 'with the repre-
sentatives of those fire and liability insurance companies which operate
outside of the American Agency System (usually referred to as direct
writers or direct sellers) 'and -which pay their representatives on a
salary or a salary plus commission basis; expirations are the property
of the insurer. While it 'is not impossible to conceive of an amalgama-
tion of the two 'systems, it could not be accomplished without great
trauma. Even then there is no assurance that the professional--client
relationship would 'be avoided. Quite to the contrary. A breakthrough
has already ,occurred in the Hannon Motor Lines case.42 The insurer
in that case was the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, a direct
wri:ter. Yet -this did not prevent the federal court from imposing upon
its representative a duty of trust to the insured who was to be con-
sidered as his client.
One other possible point of balance, which would not necessitate
an abandonment of the American Agency System, 'involves a new
method ,of compensating the -producer. It has 'already f'ound some slight
acceptance -in the placing of large lines of insurance. Such a method
involves the elimination of any commission 'built into the price. The
rate is then quoted "net" and the agent is paid for 'his services by way
of 'a fee from the insured. To the extent that the producer acts in
surveying the 'risk, applying the standards of risk management, seeking
a market and bargaining for a price, he i's acting solely as the repre-
sentative of the insured to whom 'he owes 'his full and 'undivided loyalty.
No self-interest may intervene. However, it is possible to conceive of
this same producer acting as a local serviceman for one or more com-
panies and, -in this capacity, performing subsequent service functions in
connection with business he 'may place with such companies. It would
be necessary, however, to amend the present insurer-agent agreement
so as -to identify the limited area in which the agent owed any loyalty
to the insurer.
Such an arrangement would comply with the criteria laid down by
the courts when they accepted the possibility of a dual agency in the
41. 159 F. Supp. 795 (D. Hawaii 1958).
42. Hannon Motor Lines, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 214 F. Supp. 250,
256 (W.D. Ind. 1963).
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operation of the American Agency System. As stated in the Hampton
Roads Carriers case,4 such a dual agency is possible and proper "where
there 'is good faith, no conflict of interests and due authority from both
principals. . . ." Such a situation can exist, as hereinbefore pointed
out, only when the agency for insurer and insured fall in different areas
and the duty of the producer to each of his prinoipals is so sharply
divided that 'his own personal inlterest iis not injected into the situation.
Anything short of this would negate the possibility which the Hampton
Roads Carriers case and the entire line of similar cases posit.
V. CONCLUSION
While 'it may be possible to find a point of equilibrium at some
part-way point and maintain the 'basic elements of the American Agency
System, the trend of 'the decided cases seems to 'indidate that this will
not be possible. The companies apparently realize this, 'if a proper
interpretation can 'be placed upon the expansion of branch offices and
the purchase by agency-oriented companies of local agencies. This
would seem to indicate an 'acceptance upon their part of the inevitability
of ,a new arrangement. Under this new arrangement, the 'insurer would
have no agents who also represented the insured. Through their local
offices, these insurers would deal with representatives of the inswed,
with professional brokers who would owe their loyalty only to the
insured. Such an arrangement prevails today in the market for re-
insurance. Servicing of the 'business written would 'be performed by
the local offices -acting solely on behalf of the insurers. Such an arrange-
ment would still not fall 'into the category of direct selling because the
insurer would deal with a middleman, the broker, who would control
the business and own the expirations. The transfer of many agency
operations to the computers may help accelerate this process of re-
orientation.
So much of the present system has 'been built into ou" statutes and
is supported by contracts and custom that ,any change cannot come
abruptly. Nonetheless, present indications are that, in the not too dis-
tanit future, the independent agent will come to -call himself an inde-
pendent 'broker, and the American Agency System Will be replaced by
the American Brokerage System.
43. Hampton Roads Carriers, Inc. v. Boston Ins. Co., 150 F. Supp. 338 (D.
Md. 1957).
[VOL. 12 : p. 535
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/6
